Following a logistical explication of metaphysics Quine can be cast as an ideological antirealist about modality. However, it is not clear that Quine deserves to be called a modal skeptic since, I argue, he does not hold some of the extreme views about modality that are often associated with him. Moreover, while QuineÕs convictions about truth make many forms of antirealism unacceptable to him, he might be construed as a non-skeptical modal quasi-realist (a la Blackburn). I suggest further that the application of this paradigm to metaphysical necessity might proceed from the association of that concept with those explored in QuineÕs ÒNatural KindsÓ.
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The Quinean method of explicating classical metaphysics is logistical: we proceed by transforming questions in the material mode (those about numbers, attributes, modal features of reality etc.) into questions in the formal mode (those about symbols). When the logistical method is applied to explicate that part of metaphysics that is ontology, wherein Quine is anticipated by Frege (1884), questions about the existence of given objects such as numbers are, of course, not to be taken as equivalent to questions about the existence of the relevant symbols (numerals). The logistical approach is methodological rather than reductive: it guides us towards the appropriate symbols and the kinds of question about them that we have to answer in order to establish knowledge of what there is, and of how things are, beyond the symbols. A logistical explication of ontology has two elements. The first element is the identification of (what I shall call) the telling discourse. This tells us where to look to settle questions of ontology. The second element is the proposal of a particular syntactic criterion that is to be applied to the telling discourse. This tells us how to find there that which is is ontologically significant. QuineÕs earlier and lesser-known paper on the explication of ontology, originally published in 1939, has a title that makes explicit his endorsement of this method Ð that is: ÒA Logistical Approach to the Ontology ProblemÓ (1976a) 1 . The application of the method comes to maturity in its more famous successor, originally published in 1948 , ÒOn What There IsÓ (1953a . Quine takes the ontologically telling discourse to be the optimal formulation of best total science.
Optimality is primarily a matter of simplicity in various respects. and the deployment of a canonical notation whose terms are primitive (not further definable). Beyond this, I will not explore further the scholarly question of exactly 1 Where a reference is given without an attached name (as here with Ò(1976a)Ó) it corresponds to the item in the bibliography given for Quine (here, ÒQuine
what Quine takes to make for the optimal formulation of best total science. I shall simply label this discourse, the one that Quine supposes to be ontologically telling, as ÒBest TheoryÓ. To complete the logistical explication of the ontological question, and departing from the method of his logistical precursor Frege, Quine proposes to apply to Best Theory the syntactical criterion of discerning the predicates that characterize the bound variables of (existential) quantification. To be, following logistical explication, is to be the value of a bound variable: and for FÕs to be is for Ò∃xFxÓ to be a conjunct of Best Theory (which, qua Best Theory, we take to be true).
This logistical approach to questions of ontology is, I believe, intended by Quine 1953b, 28-31) is that the Fregean strategy is demonstrably ineffective:
it fails even if, for the sake of argument, we allow that the notion of analyticity is in perfectly good standing and that one may appeal to that notion in order to supply adequate criteria of identity for whatever extraordinary entities are postulated. The heart of the ineffectiveness proof is a lemma to this effect: that the language in which we quantify over the sense-like entities would have to be such that it never affords distinct ways of specifying a variable value one of which produces an analytically necessary truth and the other an analytically contingent truth. Quine then demonstrates that a language can be so only if we take all (or none) of its true sentences to be analytically necessary, thus rendering modal distinctions vacuous and pointless.
The second strategy Ð and now the only live strategy Ð for establishing the intelligibility of, Ò∃x£FxÓ, is to stick with our ordinary conception of quantification as ranging over the ÒextensionalÓ entities with which we are familiar while departing from the understanding of modality in terms of analyticity. Such a modality would be as it is ingenuously presented at the primal de re modal scene Ò∃x£FxÓ: it would be a matter of (the variable value) x having in itself, or only qua x, an ÒattributeÓ F, necessarily and with the values of x as ordinarily understood.
So physical objects, sets (and congeries of these) would also be such that: (i) some but not all x would satisfy F; (ii) among those, some y would satisfy £F and others z not so and (iii) all of that would be perfectly in order without regard to any consideration about the mode of presentation of the values of x, y, z [(1953b, ¤III); 1976b, ¤III) ]. It would have been useful for Quine to have had to hand a label for modality, so ÒextraordinarilyÓ understood. And since Quine had already made it clear (1976b, ¤I)) that he was interested in a logic of absolute modality rather than one of restricted or local modality (causal, physical etc.) it, I think we can see that the future supplied that label. Thus, I shall say, that Quine is thinking Ð at this stage in the dialectic Ð that the only chance that QML has of being intelligible and of expressing non-trivial modal distinctions is if it is taken as the logic of a metaphysical modality. One can even imagine Quine having been tempted by the term but having disciplined himself to forego it, lest it seem like a cheap pejorative thrown in for rhetorical effect. In any event, for immediate purposes, no more should be read into the present use of the adjective, ÒmetaphysicalÓ, than that it is a label for an absolute modality that satisfies the conjunction of (i)-(iii) above.
What, then, is QuineÕs assessment of the standing of necessity and the quantified logic of modality, now that their joint viability is revealed as dependent squarely on the understanding of the modality as metaphysical? It cannot be emphasized enough that QuineÕs objection to QML at this stage in the dialectic is of a quite different nature to any complaints or concerns that have figured so far.
We are no longer at an impasse of unintelligibility as we were when confronted with the primal de re modal scene and bound to understand both modality and quantification as we ÒordinarilyÓ would. There, recall, the prospect was of a condition that could be (not just logically but) analytically true of a thing in itself, independently of any mode of presentation. Nor are we in a position to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the appeal to the surviving strategy of appeal to metaphysical necessity, as we were in the case of the Fregean attempt to combine an analytic understanding of necessity with an extraordinary account of the domain of quantification. The nature of QuineÕs objection to QML at this point is different and, ultimately, simple. The objection is that the quantified logic of metaphysical modality brings such costs that optimal scientific Theory can only be Best without it: the only intelligible version of QML has no place in Best Theory.
The exploration of an objection of this nature will naturally proceed through a sequence of questions. What did Quine take the commitments of sustaining QML to be? Was Quine right about these being commitments of sustaining QML? Why did Quine think of these commitments, negatively, as costs? Was Quine right to think that the sum of the costs makes them prohibitive? And in each case, of course, there will be a question of dialectical perspective. Is there room to allow an answer to the question from one who is pre-disposed to QML that differs from that likely to be given by one who is not so disposed? Present limitations of space prohibit a thorough exploration of this nature. So I shall be selective in dealing with only some aspects of the matter.
Quine ( 1953b, 1976b) enumerates three commitments that flow from sustaining QML under the constraints that apply at this juncture. The first commitment is to a particular matter of modal doctrine Ð that is, to a particular version of the principle of the necessity of identity: Ò∃x£FxÓ: The second commitment is logical:
it is to a version of first-order, non-modal logic, in which the practice, methods and applications become variously more complicated and restricted in order that it might support a modal extension. The third commitment is a metaphysical commitment to a doctrine that Quine identifies as Aristotelian Essentialism. In the remainder of this paper, it is only to the alleged commitment to, and costs of, Aristotelian Essentialism that direct and significant attention will be paid. My strategy will be simply claim the label ÒAristotelian EssentialismÓ for the doctrine that there are fundamental and appropriately discriminating truths of metaphysical necessity as it has been characterized above. The truths in question will be fundamental because they are expressed in the canonical notation of Best Theory. The truths in question will be appropriately discriminating in ways already accounted for: they will not entail that all of an individualÕs attributes are attached to it of necessity nor will they be conceived so that the truths of metaphysical necessity are co-extensive with those of analytic necessity.
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Famously, or infamously, Quine does very little to justify his view that commitment to the metaphysics of Aristotelian Essentialism. In the immediate dialectical context of (1953b), in particular, Quine sees no need to do so, since he has in mind there broadly logical empiricist interlocutors (Church, Carnap etc.) who are bound to agree immediately that such a commitment is unwelcome. So some construction is required of what Quine would say next when challenged to provide reasons for counting commitment to Aristotelian Essentialism as a cost.
¤II.2 HereÕs WhatÕs Wrong With Good, Old-Fashioned Aristotelian Essentialism
Here I construct a broad dilemma on QuineÕs behalf. Either we treat the commitment to Aristotelian essentialism as a product of an unexplicated metaphysics or as a product of an explicated metaphysics. If the commitment is one that is generated from the practice of unreconstructed, unexplicated metaphysics then, as such, it has no intellectually respectable justification. The commitment to Aristotelian Essentialism would be epistemologically indefensible.
If the commitment is one that is generated from the practice of explicated metaphysics, then that is the right way to make it epistemologically defensible:
6 In claiming the term ÒAristotelian EssentialismÓ, for this purpose, Quine joined in an orthodoxy that long prevailed by presuming the interchangeability of the characterizations of Ò£Ó as essentiality and as metaphysically necessity. This will strike the student of recent essentialism, e.g. of Fine (1994) , and perhaps also the students of Aristotle, as a gauche conflation Ð there being more to essentiality than metaphysical necessity. However, it is enough for our purposes that at least some of what Aristotelians take to be properly essential is also a mater of metaphysical necessity.
but only if one is further prepared to defend the place of essentialist locutions in Best Theory. Yet, that is a commitment to defend the place of essentialist locutions in the optimal formulation of total science, and that Ð in its most obvious form Ð would be a commitment to defend the scientific viability, and desirability, of the reformulation of doctrines of relativity and quantum mechanics in the language of Aristotelian (potentialist) theories of matter and motion (made systematic by the presence of the devices of QML). defending an approach to metaphysics that is explicatory but non-logistical. The remaining strategies involve defending a logistical explication of metaphysics that departs from QuineÕs version either: (the fourth) in its conception of the appropriate syntactic criteria or (the fifth) in the discourse it identifies as (metaphysically) telling. This very last strategic prospect, in particular, is likely to appeal to many. For it appears to allow the construction of a case, under the aegis of explicated metaphysics, for ideological modal realism. Such a case would be constructed by establishing for appropriate modal locutions (those that articulate Aristotelian Essentialism and are regimented in QML) a role in a discourse that is, resolutely, scientific but broader than Best Theory. There is no 7 That there is a connection in QuineÕs thinking, between the acceptability of QML and the acceptability of Aristotelian science, is a point that has been made by various commentators: see, e.g., Hylton (2007, 354) . Here, I attempt to allocate to that element of QuineÕs thinking a precise role in a comprehensive case against the acceptability of QML.
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case to answer against the intelligibility of such a discourse. For as has been emphasized, Quine has not argued that the distinction between attributes had of necessity and attributes had contingently (absolutely so and independently of description) is one that is unintelligible, unserviceable, outrŽ or otherwise beyond the pale of reason. I shall return in ¤III, to the matter of a Quinean appraisal of the role of essentialist locutions in such a broader scientific discourse.
II.2 Possible-Worlds Semantics
The second canard about QuineÕs Ò modal skepticismÓ has him claiming that QML was semantically or meta-logically defective, and subsequently being refuted by the development of possible-worlds semantic for QML by Kripke (and others). There is a long story to be told here, but it might be curtailed as follows. Firstly, the versions of QML that Quine considered had no actuality operators: accordingly the formulas are not capable of expressing (directly) that there are things that exist but which do not actually exist. Secondly, even if a version of QML has that expressive power it is not obvious why acceptance of the logic should come with an automatic commitment to assert such sentences (under their intended interpretation). So it is reasonable to conclude that any alleged commitment to the existence of (what are really and truly called) ÒpossibiliaÓ can be derived from the adoption of QML only in conjunction with a great deal of ideology that goes beyond a commitment to basic Aristotelian Essentialism.
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PART III: W(h)ither Quinean ÒModal SkepticismÓ?
QuineÕs modal skepticism as it has emerged thus far, is in its salient feature, rather orthodox. In the classical metaphysical argot, the salient feature is endorsement of the controversial Ð but hardly iconoclastic Ð Humean thesis that modality is not a feature of (fundamental) reality. One thing that distinguishes QuineÕs position apart from others who also assert the Humean thesis is the methodological basis on which he asserts it: this includes the logistical explication of metaphysical questions and the identification of Best Theory as the telling discourse. While QuineÕs methodology has, certainly, made its mark on the prosecution of metaphysics by the later Humeans ((Lewis (1986), Sider (2011)) it is not embraced wholeheartedly by them. However, I will suggest now that there is significantly more than this methodological variation to distinguish Quine from his fellow metaphysical Humeans. In order to get at the more important and farreaching difference, we need to be guided by two precepts.
The first precept is to abandon expectation that Quine will be found saying anything that is more skeptical about modality than is encapsulated in the Humean thesis. My understanding is that the characterization of Quine as modal skeptic is (at least often) the consequence of what I would regard as mistakes that were called out in Part II. Those mistakes are to misunderstand Quine as having claimed that the modal notions were steeped in intractable paradox, or unintelligible tout court, or that QML was insusceptible to meta-logical treatment.
Someone who held one of those views might naturally and justifiably be raised (or demoted) to the status of skeptic about modality: but Quine did not hold either of those views. Consequently, I think it is much more helpful, both in avoiding the continuation of misunderstanding and in lighting the way ahead, to abandon the characterization of Quine as a modal skeptic and to rebrand him (less extravagantly) as a modal antirealist. One part of a modal antirealist package, as I envisage it, is metaphysical: it is the Humean denial of the presence of modal features in reality. The other part of a modal antirealist package is a narrative in the philosophy of language (and thought): a story about the workings and function of modal language that complements the (negative) metaphysical thesis.
The second precept is that we should not presume that there is much more to be had in QuineÕs corpus by way of an explicit contribution to the narrative about modal language that is to be integrated into the modal antirealist package.
Accordingly, we should be prepared to extract materials from that corpus with a view to constructing such narrative: a narrative that is more cautiously and better described as ÒQuineanÓ than as ÒQuineÕsÓ. I shall make suggestions about both the form and content of such a Quinean modal antirealist narrative. The matter of form is one of deriving from QuineÕs philosophy of language the acceptability or otherwise of certain kinds of antirealist narrative, or paradigm. The matter of content is one of filling out that form, or paradigm, with the kind of material that is appropriate for the given the explanandum: that is, is the language of metaphysical modality.
¤III.1 Anti-Quinean Paradigms of Antirealism
In this section I shall argue that the Quinean antirealist is bound to refuse a wide range of well-known anti-realist paradigms and that she will naturally find amenable another: namely quasi-realism. In the first instance, I shall argue: (a)
that Quine cannot be properly classified as a reductive anti-realist, nor a noncognitivist, nor a fictionalist, nor an error-theorist about modality, because (b) these orthodox anti-realist paradigms share presumptions about meaning and (especially) truth which Quine is determined to refuse.
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Let us begin with a two-fold proposition that all parties contract to accept Ð that is: (a) various token sentences are admitted as intimations of absolute and metaphysical modality (ÒIt is necessary that electrons are negatively chargedÓ;
ÒWater necessarily contains HydrogenÓ, ÒHuman beings are essentially mammalianÓ, ÒIt is a contingent matter that the universe is law-governedÓ, etc. The first antirealist paradigm to be considered is that of analytic reductionism. Lewis (1986) champions the analytic reduction of the modal to the non-modal and he does so, partly, in support of what he regards as a distinct project of metaphysical reduction of the modal to the non-modal. 11 But analytic reduction, requires a commitment to the two dogmas of empiricism that Quine (1953c) rejects: that is implementation of the analytic-synthetic distinction and reduction that proceeds sentence-by-sentence. Here I will place no weight at all on the 10 If I am right about the paradigms, then this will constrain the form that a
Quinean ÒskepticalÓ stance about many subject-matters can take Ð thus, for example: linguistic meaning, propositional attitudes and their contents.
11 For this account of the duality of LewisÕs reductionism see Divers & Fletcher (2018 The second antirealist paradigm is that of metaphysical reductionism, articulated via substantive conceptions of grounding, correspondence (of sentences with reality) or truth-making (see, e,g. Sider (2011)). This paradigm prompts immediate rejection by Quine on the grounds that it is an explicit attempt to explain the truth of sentences by substantial elaboration of the notion of correspondence. For Quine, there is no scientific merit in such correspondence theories of truth in general. We shall see shortly some of the reasons for his thinking so, the locus classicus of these being Quine (1960 ). For Quine (e.g. 1970 , the right kind of theory of truth is disquotational and clausal a la Tarski.
And once we accept that, while talk of realityÕs making sentences true may sometimes be excused as unobjectionable realism it is always Òunhelpful realismÓ (1981b, 179) . It is this explicit and defining feature of metaphysical reductionism that is presently crucial, for it is generalizable. If any modal sentence is true it has to be analysable in principle Ð by traditional semantic analysis and/or metaphysical semantics Ð in such a way that it is mapped onto a fundamental state of reality (as the reductionist conceives it and as described in the telling narrative). In face of this correspondence conditional, the antirealist move is to deny the consequent: the relevant modal sentences are not so analysable, and so they are not true. Quine can have no more truck with this method when deployed in the cause of non-reductive anti-realisms than when deployed in the reductionist case. But the non-reductive anti-realist paradigms bring into consideration a feature that is non-incidental and, indeed, absolutely crucial to the understanding of QuineÕs rejection of the correspondence conceit.
The antirealist paradigms cited (non-cognitivism, error theory and fictionalism)
are faced with an urgent demand to explain the truth-indicating data that are a feature of every discourse. The declarative sentences that get it right, whatever ÒitÓ is, are called ÒtrueÓ and held true. Recall, in particular, that all parties have contracted to accept that there are token sentences intimating metaphysical modality and that some of these are held-true. The demand to explain the truth- 13 Another such paradigm that might be cited is agnosticism. But inclusion of that case engenders the distracting complications in exposition that are required to register all variants on the difference between not holding-true and holding nottrue.
indicating data is met in the form of appeal, in one way or another, to some feature (sometimes ÒnormÓ) that is subsidiary to truth (cf Wright 1992, @). For the discourse to be stable and workable, there has to be something to the idea that (on a given occasion) it there are some sentences that it is right to assent to and others that it is not right to assent to. For the integrity, utility and persistence of the practice requires that we canÕt just have a free-for-all in which anything can be allowed to go in judgments of whatÕs prime, or right, or in the spirit of the legislation, or what cannot be water. Thus we have the idea that while not hitting on the truth, what assenters do succeed in doing when they get it right is to hit on truth-in-the-fiction, or quasi-truth, or assertibility or some species of these that is appropriate to the particular discourse at issue. 14 To Quine, such dualism about assent is deeply objectionable since it threatens to undermine the eligibility of the notion of truth to feature in an empirical semantics. The dominant Quinean thought in this territory will be that the empirical relevance and respectability of the concept of truth depends on its being bound to (observable) acts of assent, where these are also described as holdings-true. Truth is that which sentences are held to have when they are assented to. If any antirealist paradigm is going to be predicated on a crucial distinction between what sentences are being held to have when they are assented to and Genuine Truth, it must be equipped with a response to the imminent allegation that it is buying into a transcendent metaphysical notion of truth that resists explication in terms of the most natural empirical considerations available. 15 My claim here is not that this observation 14 Thus see, for example, we find norms other than truth coming to the fore in the antirealist narratives of: Mackie (1977) on morals (1977); Dennett (1981) on the intentional; Field (1989) on (pure) mathematics; the Wittgenstein of Kripke (1983) on meaning and van Fraassen (1980) on the microphysical.
15 Davidson (1982) and Lewis (1983 Lewis ( , 2004 are prominent philosophers who have followed Quine in motivating appeal to the concept of truth through the project of interpretation and rejecting the correspondence conceit accordingly. It is striking that these philosophers also give short shrift to the sorts of non-defeats all such anti-realist paradigms: it would be excessive to claim that there could never be such an adequate response and (so) that the first Quinean strike ought to prompt unconditional surrender. My claim, rather, is that this is the salient factor in explaining why a Quinean will feel perfectly justified in proceeding by putting such antirealist paradigms on the back-burner and seeking other options that do not tamper with the fundamental connection that appears crucial to the explication of the pre-scientific notion of truth Ð viz.: when language users assent to sentences, truth is what they take them, rightly or wrongly, to have.
A Quinean modal antirealist narrative must complement the Humean denial of the existence of modal features of reality. What has now emerged as the salient desideratum is that such a narrative should further abjure the conceit that truth is a matter of explicable correspondence to reality. There is one paradigm of antirealism that fits this bill and is in many other respects Quine-friendly: that is a certain version of the quasi-realism introduced and commended by Blackburn (1984 Ch.6; . 16 I postpone elaboration of this claim until I am in a position to reductive antirealist paradigms that I have claimed to be dependent on the correspondence conceit.
16 A word might be entered here about other paradigms of ÒantirealismÓ that proceed from a minimalist conception of truth, salient cases of which are exemplified by the positions developed by Wright (1992) . This matter deserves much further serious investigation. But the basic feature of those positions, as I understand them, is that their claim of truth (minimally construed) for sentences of the discourse leaves no room for the denial of their being modal (moral, mathematical) features of the world. All that one can say is that our best practices in these spheres deprives the relevant judgments of objectivity where this does not sustain the right to say that there are no such features of the world.
So any form of ÒantirealismÓ that has this character will not suit one, such as integrate discussion of this form of antirealism with the considerations about content to which I now turn.
¤III.2 Metaphysical Necessity at the Nexus of Similarity
One piece in QuineÕs corpus that promises a great deal in the way of constructing an antirealist narrative for essentialist locutions is the paper ÒNatural KindsÓ The thought is that if essentialist locutions can be connected appropriately to some or all of those other locutions that Quine has placed in the sphere of explication by similarity, then the kind of antirealist narrative that he offers to cover those might be extended to cover essentialist locutions also. In advance of the development of that narrative, it is also possible to discern a cluster of connections that have the potential to prove effective in that regard. Thus Ð for The general form of the quasi-realist narrative, or paradigm, as I would appropriate it from Blackburn (1984 , Ch.6: 1993 , has the following profile. Firstly, it is anti-realistic because it claims the right, against an explicatory background, to endorse a metaphysical position according to which reality is devoid of certain things or features. Secondly, it is expressivist in spirit because it embraces the idea that some locutions are born of the need to cope with what there really is rather than to copy what there really is. Thirdly, it is minimalist about truth and allows it to spread all across our language to the parts of it in which we are exercising our attempts to cope alongside our attempts to copy. Thus the conceit of a substantial correspondence theory of truth is abjured. Fourthly, it embraces the cognitive primacy of natural science. Fifthly, it is non-skeptical and non-errortheoretic. It proceeds from the presumption that the locutions of metaphysical modality do not betray a failure or a mistake on our part. With this paradigm to hand, we then now consider how it might be applied to the language of natural kind, causality, law, disposition, counterfactuality and Ð extending the conceptual network Ð to the language of essence or metaphysical necessity. Here are some gestures in that direction, and some attendant caveats.
The role of non-telling scientific locutions, it has been mooted, is that of sustaining the scientific mission of searching for and exploiting ultimate objective similarities. But not by providing us with what we need to state such similarities.
For that is what is achieved in Best Theory by the telling locutions of science. Yet even if Ð and it is a non-trivial ÒifÓ Ð the statement of Best Theory is the ultimate goal of scientific theory, the language of Best Theory is too austere and remote from the ways in which the world strikes us, too far removed from the manifest image, to serve our needs to communicate: that is, our needs both to communicate to each other things about the world and to communicate to each other things about our attempts to discover those as we do in the practice of science. But once freed from the correspondence conceit, and the unreconstructed metaphysical intuitions that sustain it, we have no need to demand too much of the truths that we utter in successful scientific communication. When we say, for example, that it is a law that all FÕs are GÕs, or that F-ness is counterfactually dependent on G-ness, and claim that we speak truly, we do not give a hostage to any project that requires that these sayings should be analysable in terms of, or are true in virtue of, the existence of ultimate objective similarities. Equally, when we say that lemons are essentially citrus fruits but not essentially yellow, we may speak truly by saying something that relates expressively to ultimate similarities other than by having the same semantic or metaphysical semantic content as a statement of any such similarities. Here is the beginning of a suggestion as to how that might be so.
The use of essentialist locutions is especially congenial when scientists are engaged in the practice of refining and broadening the similarities that we discern Ð progressing from phenomenological similarity to deeper underlying similarities that are similarities in respect of theoretical concepts in biology, chemistry and physics. Thus, we come to say that lemons are essentially citrus fruits but not essentially yellow as our confidence increases in our progression towards the discovery of the real natures of things. But confidence is not something that one naturally expresses by stating that one has it, and so the thought emerges that deployment of essentialist locutions is the expressive emblem of that confidence.
Moreover, as we learn from the moral expressivist tradition, it is doubtful that our useful expressions are only epiphenomenal manifestations of attitude. Especially when we have emphasized the needs of scientific communication, it would be natural to attempt to develop an appreciation of that dimension of essentialist commitments in which we encourage others to do something. And so we arrive at the proto-thought that proclaiming the necessity of lemons being citrus fruits is to be understood in terms of its being an expression of confidence in our being in the right direction of travel in the search for real natures Ð and a recommendation of that research programme to others.
For those who would pursue along such lines a non-skeptical Quinean anti-realist narrative about metaphysical necessity, the following caveats ought to loom large.
Firstly, we already have evidence that some ways of explicating metaphysical necessity via appeal to similarity have been rejected by Quine: thus his (1981c)
critique of a (non-standard) analysis of necessity de re in terms of counterparts Secondly, the elaboration of modal quasi-realism offered by Blackburn (1986) suggests that there may indeed be something special Ð and especially bad Ð about modal commitments. This relates to the conditions under which we acquire modal beliefs rather than those (as described above) under which we manifest them and the prospect of a deep incompatibility between modalizing and naturalism. Thirdly, the preliminary explorations of Quine (1969a) do not suggest that all locutions of dispositionality, counterfactuality etc. can be vindicated by establishing appropriate relations to the quest for ultimate objective similarities.
So it would be prudent to hope for such vindication of only some, rather than all, essentialist locutions that philosophers would promote.
¤IV Prologue
I am more sanguine about the consideration of Quine as a modal quasi-realist than I am about getting at metaphysical necessity through considerations about ultimate objective similarity. But I am most sanguine of all about our learning more about modality by continuing to study Quine in a constructive spirit than we do by putting aside his work as outdated and barren modal skepticism and looking elsewhere. 
